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"By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing
excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional
approval, [the dormant Commerce Clause] strikes at one of the chief
evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tar-
iffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce."1 The Su-
preme Court of Ohio emphasized this quote, both in its majority
opinion and in Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion, in the case of
Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa.2 This 2016 case involved a constitutional
challenge to Ohio's commercial-activity tax ("CAT") by Crutchfield
Corporation ("Crutchfield"), a company that had no connection to
Ohio other than the shipment of goods to customers located in Ohio
by way of the United States Postal Service or other common car-
rier.3 The CAT is imposed on each person or business receiving
gross-receipts of $500,000 or more from goods that were "ultimately
received [in Ohio] after all transportation [was] completed."4
Crutchfield argued that the tax was unconstitutionally applied due
to a lack of substantial nexus with the state of Ohio because it had
no physical presence there; however, the Supreme Court of Ohio
disagreed, finding that physical presence, while sufficient, is not
necessary to impose a business privilege tax.5 The Court held that
there only needs to be "an adequate quantitative standard," and the
$500,000 minimum threshold constituted such a standard.6
The majority opinion distinguished seemingly applicable case
law in two ways. First, it excluded, as distinguishable, any case law
decided prior to Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady ("Complete
Auto").7 The Crutchfield court noted that the Complete Auto deci-
sion lifted the ban on all taxation for the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce imposed by Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
O'Connor.8 Instead, Complete Auto imposed a four-part test under
which state taxation of interstate commerce is analyzed today.9
Second, the court contrasted business privilege taxes, which tax
1. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 914, 916 (Ohio 2016) (alteration in origi-
nal) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1794 (2015)).
2. Id.; see also id. at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 902.
4. Id. at 902-03.
5. Id. at 904, 910.
6. Id. at 910.
7. Id. at 908; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977).
8. Crutchfield, 88 N.E.3d at 907; see also Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 289; Spector Motor
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951) (holding that states cannot tax "the privilege of
doing interstate business"), overruled by Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 28.
9. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
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business gross-receipts, with sales and use taxes, which tax indi-
vidual purchases.10 It reasoned that, because the individuals being
taxed were different, the cases concerning sales and use taxes, such
as Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, were not applicable law for the case
at hand.11 Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion, stated, "The
majority relies on the absence of United States Supreme Court de-
cisions directly on point and treats this case as though it exists in a
vacuum. It does not.
'12
Crutchfield raises an interesting dilemma for current e-com-
merce sellers: Should states be permitted to impose business privi-
lege taxes on Internet-based companies, whose sole connection to
the state is customers' receipt of goods through the mail?13 The an-
swer is that the current scheme of state business privilege taxes
present unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce, and Con-
gress should enact legislation which sets an economic percentage
maximum and clarifies the many questions these tax schemes raise.
The analysis begins with the foundation of the dormant Commerce
Clause implied in the Constitution, and an overview of the major
applicable and comparable case law beginning with Complete Auto
and shifting to the interpretation of the four prongs of the Complete
Auto test. Next, an analysis of what e-commerce is and its current
state provides necessary information for the application of the Com-
plete Auto test to business privilege taxes on Internet-based retail-
ers. Finally, a look at the negative legal and economic impacts of
these taxes on Internet-based interstate commerce leads to a con-
clusion that the current state business privilege tax scheme is un-
constitutional and, as a result, Congress should enact legislation
concerning Internet-based retailers.
10. Crutchfield, 88 N.E.3d at 911.
11. Id. at 910-11; see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1992), over-
ruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
12. Crutchfield, 88 N.E.3d at 916 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 904; see also Diversified Ingredients, Inc. v. Testa, No. 4:15-CV-1935RLW, 2016
WL 2932160, at -1, *3 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (holding the federal district court lacked jurisdiction
to hear a dispute regarding Ohio's Commercial Activity Tax and Diversified Ingredients, Inc.,
an online company with no connection to Ohio other than the shipment of commodity pet food
ingredients to customers located in Ohio); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation
& Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 626 (N.Y. 2013) (holding New York's Internet Tax constitutional as
applied to Overstock.com, Inc. and Amazon.com, LLC because the companies contracted with
local website owners to solicit sales via advertisements. "The bottom line is that if a vendor
is paying New York residents to actively solicit business in this state, there is no reason why
that vendor should not shoulder the appropriate tax burden.").
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II. FROM THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, FOUND IN THE
CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT HAS INFERRED THE
EXISTENCE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, WHICH CONTROLS
WHEN A STATE MAY TAX INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
A. The Origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause
One of Congress's most important enumerated powers is the
Commerce power, because it allows Congress to legislate a broad
array of topics.1 4 The Constitution states, "The Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. '15 From this provi-
sion, the Supreme Court has inferred the principle that state and
local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on
interstate commerce.16 "If Congress has legislated, the question is
whether the federal law preempts the state or local law .... -17 If
Congress has not passed legislation either in support of or invali-
dating state and local laws, those laws can be challenged as "unduly
impeding interstate commerce."18 The latter is referred to as the
dormant Commerce Clause.19
Congress, however, has neither passed nor invalidated business
privilege taxes imposed on Internet-based companies whose only
contact with the state is the shipment of goods to customers therein;
therefore, any state business privilege tax, including the Ohio CAT,
falls under the dormant Commerce Clause.20 As demonstrated by
the discussion below, the Supreme Court has, throughout recent
history, recognized the difficulty of applying the dormant Com-
merce Clause to interstate commerce considering changing busi-
ness environments and a technologically advancing society.
14. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 250 (Richard
A. Epstein et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.




20. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2018); c.f. S. Res. 433, 115th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2018) (deciding that the Marketplace Fairness Act, which proposes a uniform
sales tax on Internet purchases, would be unduly burdensome to small businesses and harm-
ful to the economy).
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B. The Establishment of the Complete Auto Test
From the conception of the dormant Commerce Clause until
1977, the Supreme Court enforced the rule that no state was per-
mitted to directly tax interstate commerce.21 In 1977, however,
Complete Auto was decided, and the Court refused to adopt a per se
rule to govern state taxation of interstate commerce; instead, the
Court established a four-part test.22 Complete Auto Transit, Inc., a
Michigan corporation, transported vehicles for General Motors Cor-
poration ("General Motors").23 General Motors would assemble cars
outside of Mississippi, ship them into Mississippi via railway, and
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. would then load the cars onto its trucks
for transport to the Mississippi dealers.24 Mississippi imposed a
business privilege tax on Complete Auto Transit, Inc. for its activity
in the state.25 The Supreme Court of Mississippi sustained the tax,
reasoning that Complete Auto Transit, Inc. was "dependent upon
the State for police protection."
26
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision
and found the law constitutional.27 It reasoned that Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. argued only that the tax was unconstitutional because
it "was imposed on nothing other than the 'privilege of doing busi-
ness' that is interstate.'28 The argument was based on the Spector
Rule, which said taxes on the privilege of doing business could not
be applied to activities that are part of interstate commerce, but the
Court decided to overrule the Spector Rule.2 9 Instead, it held that
a tax would be sustained "against [the] Commerce Clause challenge
when the tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discrim-
inate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the
services provided by the State."30 The Court, however, did not apply
21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 479; see also, e.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor,
340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951), overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
288 (1977) (holding that states cannot tax "the privilege of doing interstate business"); Free-
man v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1946) (invalidating an Indiana gross receipts tax because
imposing the tax interfered with the freedom of interstate commerce); McLeod v. J.E. Dil-
worth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944) (invalidating an Arkansas sales tax because it taxed
interstate goods).
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 479.
23. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 276.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 276-77.
26. Id. at 277.
27. Id. at 289.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 277-78, 288-89.
30. Id. at 279.
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the new test to these facts because Complete Auto Transit, Inc. did
not argue any of the elements.3 1 The elements of the Complete Auto
test became the new focus of state taxation challenges. What fol-
lows is a step-by-step analysis of those four elements.
1. The Substantial Nexus
States can only tax interstate commerce when there is a "sub-
stantial nexus" between the individual being taxed and the state
imposing the tax.3 2 Prior to the "substantial nexus" inquiry estab-
lished in Complete Auto, the Court used the physical presence test,
which was first established ten years prior to Complete Auto in a
case involving an Illinois use tax.3 3 In 1967, the Department of Rev-
enue ("Department") in Illinois sued National Bellas Hess ("Na-
tional"), a mail-order corporation incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in Missouri.34 The case concerned an
Illinois tax placed on customers who purchased goods from an out-
of-state company for use within the state of Illinois.3 5 The Depart-
ment sued National, claiming the company had to collect the use
tax from its customers and pay the Department.36 The Illinois Su-
preme Court required National to pay the tax even though National
had no contacts with the state of Illinois other than twice-a-year
catalogs, occasional "flyers," and merchandise orders delivered to
its customers by mail or common carrier.3 7 On appeal to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, National argued the tax violated
the Due Process Clause and was an "unconstitutional burden upon
interstate commerce."38
The Court said the analyses for Due Process and the dormant
Commerce Clause were similar because the main question in both
was whether the individual was "accorded the protection and ser-
vices of the taxing State."3 9 It held the tax unconstitutional as an
undue burden on interstate commerce, reasoning there is a "sharp
distinction ... between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solici-
tors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id. at 279.
33. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 755 (1967), overruled by
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
34. Id. at 753-54.
35. Id. at 754.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 754-55.
38. Id. at 756.
39. Id. at 757.
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communicate with customers in the State by mail or common car-
rier."40
Following National Bellas Hess, the Court clarified in Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota that, while an individual may have the significant
contacts necessary for Due Process, that does not automatically
make those contacts sufficient to establish a substantial nexus un-
der the Complete Auto test.41 Quill, a Delaware corporation, had
offices and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia, but sold
office equipment and supplies to customers and businesses nation-
wide.42 Quill solicited sales through "catalogs and flyers, advertise-
ments in national periodicals, and telephone calls."43 North Dakota
imposed a use tax on "retailers," defined as "every person who en-
gages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in
the state," including mail-order companies without property or em-
ployees in North Dakota.44 The State sued to compel Quill to pay
the tax.
45
At trial, the court found for Quill, holding "the case indistinguish-
able from [National] Bellas Hess.'46 Further, it found that the State
failed to show a nexus allowing it to define "retailer" as it did.47 The
Court reasoned that "the State had not shown that it had spent tax
revenues for the benefit of the mail-order business."48 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed.49 It reasoned that the increase in
mail-order business and the recent decisions involving the Com-
merce Clause made National Bellas Hess an inappropriate test in
the current economic and legal setting.
50
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding the
tax unconstitutional.51 It established there is a difference in the
analyses of the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause because the two have different legislative intents.52 The
"relevant inquiry under [Complete Auto] was whether 'the state has
provided some protection, opportunities, or benefit for which it can
40. Id. at 758.
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
42. Id. at 302.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 302-03 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (1991)).






51. Id. at 319.
52. Id. at 305.
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expect a return."'53 In addition, the Court further clarified, while
its decisions after Complete Auto demonstrate a move toward more
flexible balancing rules, the bright-line physical presence test had
not been overruled.54 It reasoned that a bright-line test, while not
appropriate for every situation, furthers the ends of the dormant
Commerce Clause by "firmly establish[ing] the boundaries of legit-
imate state authority," "encourag[ing] settled expectations," and
"foster[ing] investment by business and individuals.
'55
In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the
physical presence requirement established in Quill and National
Bellas Hess.56 South Dakota enacted a law requiring out-of-state
sellers to collect and remit sales tax if, "on an annual basis, [they]
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into the State or
engage in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of
goods or services into the State.' 57 Wayfair, Inc.; Overstock.com,
Inc.; and Newegg, Inc. are all merchants that easily meet the
thresholds imposed by South Dakota's law, but the companies have
no employees or real estate in South Dakota.58 South Dakota filed
a declaratory action seeking an injunction requiring these mer-
chants to register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax.59 "Re-
spondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act is
unconstitutional.'" 60 South Dakota conceded that under National
Bellas Hess and Quill the Act is unconstitutional; however, the
state urged the Court to review those decisions.61 The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment and the South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed.6
2
The Supreme Court of the United States overruled the physical
presence requirement established in National Bellas Hess and
Quill.63 The Court reasoned that the physical presence require-
ment is arbitrary and artificial, and in the changing economic land-
scape, it ignores "substantial virtual connections to the State."
64
53. Id. at 304 (quoting State by Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 216 (N.D.
1991)).
54. Id. at 314.
55. Id. at 315-16.
56. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).






63. Id. at 2099.
64. Id. at 2092, 2095.
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Further, the Court stated, "The physical presence rule [Quill] de-
fines has limited States' ability to seek long-term prosperity and
has prevented market participants from competing on an even play-
ing field."6 5 Finally, the Court reasoned that "other aspects of the
Court's Commerce Clause doctrine can protect against any undue
burden on interstate commerce, taking into consideration the small
businesses, startups, or others who engage in commerce across
state lines.
'66
The Supreme Court, in a case involving Tyler Pipe Industries,
Inc. ("Tyler Pipe"), demonstrated that while physical presence can
be a flexible standard, there still must be some type of intentional
availment of the state's consumer market.6 7 Tyler Pipe challenged
the state of Washington for a refund of a business privilege tax, ar-
guing the company lacked a sufficient nexus for the tax to be con-
stitutionally imposed.68 Tyler Pipe sold pipes, fittings, and drain-
age products in the state of Washington.6 9 It had no offices, prop-
erty, or employees located within the state of Washington; however,
it did contract with an independent contractor out of Seattle to take
care of its daily sales business with customers.70 Both the trial
court and the state supreme court held that these sales represent-
atives established a nexus with the state.7 1 The state supreme
court specifically held that the classification of "independent con-
tractor" instead of "agent" was irrelevant.7 2 It held that the repre-
sentative acted daily on behalf of the company, calling on customers
and soliciting orders with whom Tyler Pipe has long-standing rela-
tionships, and that this action helped to increase market share for
Tyler Pipe in Washington.7 3 The Supreme Court of the United
States agreed with this reasoning, and held there was a substantial
nexus.7
4
The majority opinion in Crutchfield held that Tyler Pipe stands
for the concept that physical presence is a sufficient standard for
substantial nexus, but not a necessary standard.7 5 While this is an
accurate analysis of the holding, the Crutchfield majority failed to
recognize that the Court in Tyler Pipe certainly implied that, in the
65. Id. at 2096.
66. Id. at 2098.





72. Id. at 250.
73. Id. at 249.
74. Id. at 250-51.
75. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 912 (Ohio 2016).
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very least, the company must target that state to establish a
nexus.76 The Court quoted the reasoning of the state supreme court,
stating:
As the Washington Supreme Court determined, "the crucial
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated
with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market
in this state for the sales." The court found this standard was
satisfied because Tyler's "sales representatives perform any lo-
cal activities necessary for maintenance of Tyler Pipe's market
and protection of its interests . . .,77
The key phrases in this quote are "activities ... significantly as-
sociated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a
market in this state for the sales" and "local activities necessary for
maintenance.'" 7 8 The likely premise behind nexus is that the com-
pany is targeting that state in order to establish customer relation-
ships.
The substantial nexus portion of the Complete Auto test concerns
the nexus between the state and the seller and does not consider
the activity sought to be taxed.79 In National Geographic Society v.
California Board of Equalization, National Geographic Society ap-
pealed a decision by the California Supreme Court requiring it to
pay a business privilege tax.8 0 National Geographic Society was a
District of Columbia ("D.C.") nonprofit corporation focused on sci-
ence and education.8 1 The corporation had two offices in California
whose purpose was to solicit advertising for the monthly maga-
zine.8 2 The D.C. offices ran a mail-order business selling maps, at-
lases, globes, and books.8 3 The California office activities had no
connection to the sales from the D.C. offices.8 4 The California Su-
preme Court found the liability of tax violated neither Due Process
76. Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 250-51.
77. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 125-26 (Wash.
1996)).
78. Id.
79. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560 (1977).
80. Id. at 554.






nor the Fourteenth Amendment.8 5 It concluded "the 'slightest pres-
ence' of the seller in California established sufficient nexus between
the State and the seller."86
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision;
however, it did not agree with the "slightest presence" standard.8 7
It reasoned that the "maintenance of two offices" and "solicitation
by employees" were much more than the "slightest presence.88 The
Court disagreed with the National Geographic Society's argument
that "there must exist a nexus or relationship not only between the
seller and the taxing State, but also between the activity of the
seller sought to be taxed and the seller's activity within the State."
8 9
This implies that in cases involving business privilege taxes, the
gross-receipts being taxed must stem from some type of in-state ac-
tivity.
Based on the above cases and their application of the Complete
Auto test, there are four key takeaways regarding the substantial
nexus requirement. First, the National Bellas Hess physical pres-
ence test, which was reaffirmed in Quill Corp., has been overruled,
and is no longer applicable law.90 Second, Quill Corp. established
that the Complete Auto test requires more than just the "minimum
contacts" standard for Due Process, and that the test is focused on
what the taxpayer owes the state for usage of its resources.91 Third,
Tyler Pipe demonstrated that, while physical presence can be a flex-
ible standard, there still must be some type of intentional availment
of the state's consumer market.92 Fourth, National Geographic So-
ciety reinforced that the "slightest presence" was not a sufficient
nexus, and implied that there must be some in-state activity that
results in gross-receipts in order for those gross-receipts to be
taxed.93
2. Fair Apportionment
Fair apportionment refers to the concept that the tax should only
be focused on the business activities completed within the state im-
posing the tax, and that a state cannot tax activities in another
85. Id. at 554.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 556.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 560.
90. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
91. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992), overruled by Wayfair, 138 S.
Ct. 2080.
92. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987).
93. Nat'l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 555, 560.
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state.94 The policy behind fair apportionment is to avoid multiple
taxation of gross-receipts.9 5 Further, a tax is fairly apportioned
when it is both internally and externally consistent.
96
Internal consistency concerns the structure of the tax.97 In order
to determine whether a tax is internally consistent, one must ask
"whether its identical application by every State in the Union would
place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with com-
merce intrastate."9 8 The policy behind internal consistency is to en-
sure states are only taxing their fair share of interstate commerce;
therefore, if an activity might be subject to multiple taxation, it goes
against policy.99 For example, Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealy involved an internal consistency issue.100 Central Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. ("Central Greyhound") operated a bus that trans-
ported patrons from one point in New York to another point in New
York; however, 43% of the route was through both Pennsylvania
and New Jersey.101 New York sought to impose a tax on the gross
receipts from ticket sales of the bus line.10 2 The Tax Commission of
New York upheld the tax, and the state courts affirmed that deci-
sion.10 3 Central Greyhound appealed, arguing that the tax was un-
constitutional because the service was interstate commerce.
10 4
The Supreme Court reversed and found the tax to be unconstitu-
tional as written.10 5 It was significant that neither Pennsylvania
nor New Jersey were imposing taxes on the gross receipts from the
mileage traveled within their state.106 Although the taxes were not
implemented at that point, the mileage could have reasonably been
subject to taxation in those states as well.10 7 Based on this reason-
ing, the Court found that permitting New York to tax the out-of-
state portion of the travel was an undue burden on interstate com-
merce.10 8 It did, however, hold that the tax could be apportioned in
94. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995).
95. Id.




100. See 334 U.S. 653, 660 (1948).
101. Id. at 654, 660.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 655.
104. Id. at 654.
105. Id. at 664.





a way that would fall within the test, but that the restructuring of
the apportionment was up to the state.10 9
External consistency is not concerned with the fact that an iden-
tical statute will be imposed in another state, but it is instead con-
cerned with the possibility of two different statutes having identical
effects.110 For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., the Court analyzed an external consistency problem in-
volving a sales tax.111 Jefferson Lines, Inc. ("Jefferson") a Minne-
sota corporation, ran a bus line in Oklahoma.112 Oklahoma imposed
a sales tax on tickets for trips originating in Oklahoma.113 Jefferson
collected the sales tax on tickets for travel within the state, but not
on tickets originating in Oklahoma and terminating in another
state.114 After Jefferson filed for bankruptcy, the Tax Commis-
sioner filed to collect the unpaid taxes.
115
Jefferson opposed the imposition of tax liability, arguing that the
tax "present[ed] the danger of multiple taxation.'116 The Bank-
ruptcy Court, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals all
agreed with Jefferson,117 but the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari and reversed.118 It held the tax was "ex-
ternally consistent, as reaching only the activity taking place
within the taxing State, that is, the sale of the service."119 The
Court refused to extend the holding in Central Greyhound because,
here, the business and the customer would each be taxed for the
same activity, but neither party would be taxed twice.120 It is im-
portant to note, however, that external consistency still only in-
volves activities taking place within the state.121 Business privilege
taxes that tax activities outside of the state likely would not be ex-
ternally consistent because there is a risk of multiple taxation of
the same activity.
109. Id. at 663.
110. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
111. Id.






118. Id. at 179.
119. Id. at 196.
120. Id. at 190.




Under the Complete Auto test, state taxes may not discriminate
against out-of-state businesses.122 Taxes are discriminatory when
they are levied on either "the privilege of doing interstate business
within the state" or on "some local event so much a part of interstate
business as to be in effect a tax upon the interstate business it-
self."123 In one case addressing discrimination, Memphis Natural
Gas Company ("Memphis"), a Delaware Corporation, was operating
a pipeline through Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennes-
see.124 One hundred thirty-five miles of the pipeline ran through
Mississippi.125 Mississippi imposed a "franchise or excise tax" on
any corporation "doing business" in the state.126 Memphis peti-
tioned the Tax Commission of Mississippi for review of the tax, ar-
guing the tax was "prohibited by the Commerce Clause.' 127 The Tax
Commission approved the tax and the Court of Appeals reversed.
128
The Supreme Court of Mississippi approved of the tax and reasoned
that the state was not attempting to tax interstate commerce, but
was being compensated for "its protection of lawful activities car-
ried on in this State by the corporation, foreign or domestic."129
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision.130
It agreed with the state supreme court's reasoning that Mississippi
did not "attempt to tax the privilege of doing an interstate business"
or to gain anything other than "compensation for the protection of
the enumerated local activities of 'maintaining, keeping in repair
and otherwise in manning the facilities.'13 1 It also found that the
activities were not essential enough to interstate commerce to war-
rant protection under the Commerce Clause.13 2 The Court noted
that taxing activities outside the boundaries of the state is beyond
the power of the state, but the activities in this case were those that
"the state, not the United States, gives protection."13 3 The policy
here appears to limit a state's authority to those activities con-
ducted within its state boundaries because that state is the one
122. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
123. Memphis Nat. Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1948).
124. Id. at 80-81.
125. Id. at 81.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 82.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 96.
131. Id. at 93 (quoting Stone v. Memphis Nat. Gas Co., 29 So. 2d 268, 270 (Miss. 1947)).
132. Id. at 95.
133. Id. at 96.
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funding any type of protection or support. 13 4 Once the state starts
taxing activities beyond its boundaries, it is no longer providing
support for those activities, and it is instead taxing interstate com-
merce itself.
13 5
4. Fair Relation to State Services
The policy behind non-discriminatory taxes takes shape in the
requirement that the tax be fairly related to state services.136 A tax
requiring businesses to share in the state tax burden is only justi-
fied when it relates to the extent of the contact with that state.
137
For example, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, four Mon-
tana coal producers and eleven of their out-of-state customers
sought refunds from a Montana tax on the extraction of coal.138 The
trial court upheld the tax, and the Montana Supreme Court af-
firmed.139 The Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the extrac-
tion of coal was an intrastate activity; therefore, it was not subject
to the Commerce Clause.140 The coal producers appealed to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, arguing that "the amount col-
lected under the Montana tax is not fairly related to the additional
costs the State incurs because of coal mining."
141
The Supreme Court held that the tax was fairly related to state
services because Montana imposed it as a general revenue tax.
142 It
said the test for fair relation is not a comparison between the
amount taxed and the cost to the state associated with the activity;
instead, "the test is closely connected to the first prong of the Com-
plete Auto test.' 143 It reasoned, "the measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact, since it is the activ-
ities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be
made to bear a 'just share of state tax burden.'"' 144 Essentially, fair
relation does not mean the state may only tax the exact fair market
value of its protective or supportive services; however, it does have
134. See id. at 93-96.
135. Id. at 95.
136. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620 (1981).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 613.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 613-14.
141. Id. at 620.
142. Id. at 621.
143. Id. at 625-26.
144. Id. (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
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to ensure that the tax is "reasonably related to the extent of the
contact."
145
C. The Internet Age and E-Commerce
It is now possible for a business to have a large percentage of its
revenue come from a state where it technically conducts no business
and has no contacts other than communications with customers via
the Internet. In terms of the Commerce Clause, the Internet is
changing the way we look at state borders. The Internet itself has
no borders, and, therefore, our concept of interstate commercial ac-
tivity broadens.
With the dawn of the Internet-age, the already complicated inter-
state commerce question became more complicated due to electronic
commerce ("e-commerce"). E-commerce is "all electronically medi-
ated information exchanges between an organisation [sic] and its
external stakeholders.' 146 E-commerce is a large portion of the re-
tail market and is continuing to grow: "the estimate of U.S. retail e-
commerce sales for the third quarter of 2018, adjusted for seasonal
variation, but not for price changes, was $130.9 billion, an increase
of 3.1 percent (±0.5%) from the second quarter of 2018."147 For pur-
poses of this article, e-commerce will be focused on "[s]ell-side e-
commerce," or "transactions involved with selling products to an or-
ganisation's [sic] customers.' 148 Sell-side e-commerce involves not
only the order from the customer, but the marketing efforts leading
up to those orders.149
E-commerce challenges the dormant Commerce Clause because
it allows customers to order products directly from a website and
have them delivered to their home. The business, in turn, can con-
duct its affairs by simply using United States mail services. For
example, Amazon.com is a large-scale online retailer.150 Customers
visit the website and search for whatever product they are looking
for, anything from electronics to groceries, and they add the product
145. Id.
146. DAVE CHAFFEY, DIGITAL BUSINESS AND E-COMMERCE MANAGEMENT 13 (Pearson
Educ. Ltd., 6th ed. 2015).
147. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 3rd Quarter 2018, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 19, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/
pdf/ec current.pdf.
148. CHAFFEY, supra note 146, at 14.
149. Id. at 17.
150. AMAZON, https://amazon.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
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to their "cart."151 The consumer then goes to their "cart," and pro-
ceeds to "check-out."152 They input their payment information and
shipping information, and complete their purchase.153 Once the
purchase is complete, Amazon fulfills the orders and ships the prod-
ucts directly to the consumer. Customers can do the same on
smaller scale websites. For example, Lulu's is an online clothing
retailer where customers can make a purchase online and have the
products delivered directly to the consumer's home without Lulu's
ever having to act in the state the customer is located.
154
The evolution becomes even more strenuous when we see new
business models forming. For example, Ipsy is a subscription-based
company providing skin care and make-up products to customers.
155
Customers first create an account and fill out a survey regarding
what their product preferences are.156 The company then fills a bag
full of sample products and ships the bag to the consumer.157 The
subscription costs around $10 per month.158 In these cases, the cus-
tomer is not even the one choosing their products; they are just sign-
ing up to receive samples.159
Another example is a company like Etsy, which provides a plat-
form for individuals who sell crafts.160 On Etsy, a seller creates
their own store.161 All orders go to the seller, the seller fulfills the
order, and the seller sends out the package.16 2 The consumer, how-
ever, only ever interacts with the Etsy platform.163 They order from
Etsy.com, and Etsy communicates with the seller. Technically, un-
der the business privilege tax model currently in place in Ohio,
these individuals could be subject to business privilege taxes if they
meet the minimum revenue requirement.16 4 The issue becomes is
the tax imposed on the individual seller, Etsy.com, or are both the
seller and Etsy taxed for the same sale?
Mail-order companies were the prequel to the Internet-based
companies that are so popular today. Decisions involving mail-or-




154. LULUS, https://www.lulus.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).









164. See Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 902-03 (Ohio 2016).
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dormant Commerce Clause issues, but they still are not an exact
roadmap. Technology has allowed the basic business model struc-
ture to evolve. There are significant differences between mail-order
companies and Internet-based companies, including marketing and
payment activities. The major difference is that mail-order compa-
nies used to have to target customers directly based, at least partly,
on location by physically mailing them advertisements or catalogs;
however, Internet-based companies can target customers directly
through the Internet. In fact, the Supreme Court has established
intentionally targeting customers as a factor in the Due Process
analysis to establish sufficient contacts.16 5 Today, however, it is
possible for an advertisement o end up in a state the company did
not intentionally target.
While companies can still advertise to target specific states, they
can now target specific individuals without concern for where those
individuals live. For example, search engine optimization is "[a]
structured approach used to increase the position of a company or
its products in search engine natural or organic results listings (the
main body of the search results page) for selected keywords or
phrases.' 166 In other words, companies can target customers based
on the search terms they use.167 Social media marketing is also a
large portion of online advertising.168 Here, companies develop so-
cial media pages and allow customers to interact with the brand
and other customers.16 9 These forms of marketing do not focus on
the geographic location of the customer, but on customers' prefer-
ences and actions.
170
Another option is e-mail marketing, where companies compile
lists from customers in order to develop relationships.171 These are
often in the form of advertisements and deal emails companies send
to potential customers to entice them into making a purchase.172
There are two ways a customer can "opt-in" for advertisements, in-
cluding "Single Opt-in" and "Double Opt-in," also known as "Con-
firmed Opt-in."173 "Single Opt-in" requires subscribers merely to
165. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985).
166. CHAFFEY, supra note 146, at 20.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 21.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Susan Ward, What is Email Marketing? Email Marketing Can Be Very Effective Mar-
ketingfor Small Business, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.
com/email-marketing-2948346.
172. Id.
173. Ralph F. Wilson, Spam, Spam Bots, and Double Opt-in E-mail Lists, PRACTICAL
ECOMMERCE (Apr. 21, 2010), https://www.practicalecommerce.com/wilson-double-optin.
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insert their e-mail address in a subscription form and press "en-
ter. ' 174 "Double Opt-in" or "Confirmed Opt-in" requires both sub-
mission of an e-mail address and confirmation, usually achieved
through a link sent to the submitted e-mail.175 Most retail websites
will have an option that allows users to set up an account.176 When
the account is set up, the user must submit an e-mail address.
177
Companies will either automatically opt-in the account holder, and
provide a way to opt-out if preferred, or customers can select a box
allowing them to opt-in.178 With this changing environment, it is
time to question whether or not business privilege taxes imposed on
Internet-based companies are unconstitutional under Complete
Auto, and if there is a constitutional way to impose these taxes.
III. THE CURRENT IMPOSITION OF BUSINESS PRIVILEGE TAXES
ON INTERNET-BASED COMPANIES IS UNDULY BURDENSOME ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND SHOULD BE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
State business privilege taxes imposed on Internet-based compa-
nies, whose only contacts with the state are through the mail sys-
tem, are unconstitutional under Complete Auto because of the sig-
nificant burden they impose on interstate commerce. First, these
taxes do not meet the substantial nexus portion of Complete Auto
179
because, even under Wayfair, the only nexus these companies have
with their customers is communication via the Internet. In fact,
because of technological changes, they have less nexus in general
than even National Bellas Hess had. The insufficient physical ac-
tivity in National Bellas Hess was mailing catalogs and advertise-
ments;180 however, now, companies do not even have to physically
send advertisements into a specific state, or even target a specific
state at all. Instead, companies place advertisements in e-mails, on
social media platforms, or on search engines, and customers visit
the company websites. Unlike in Tyler Pipe and National Geo-
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., LULUS, supra note 154.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 296, 314 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
180. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967), overruled by
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
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graphic Society, these companies do not even have independent con-
tractors or associates who generate gross-receipts in the state,
18 1
and therefore there is no in-state activity that leads to revenue gen-
eration.
The argument has been made that the physical presence test is
unworkable and is inconsistent with a test balancing the interac-
tion between the company and the state.1 8 2 For example, when com-
paring Internet-based companies to traditional mail-order compa-
nies, Pamela Swidler argues that a balancing test is inconsistent
with the physical presence test.1 83 The two tests, however, are not
inconsistent. A court could require a physical presence, while still
balancing how significant that presence is against the tax imposed.
The overruling of the physical presence test is not the end of the
issue because we still do not have an answer of what constitutes a
substantial nexus. The policy behind the substantial nexus require-
ment is that the corporations affording themselves of the benefits
of the state pay their fair share of the burdens on that state.18 4 A
physical presence in a state presents much more of a burden on that
state than a virtual one, and no intentional availment of the market
presents even a slighter burden on the state. Therefore, there must
be at least some kind of intentional availment of state resources,
otherwise the corporations are being taxed for the activities of their
customers and not their own use of state resources.
In National Geographic, the slightest presence was not enough to
establish a substantial nexus.1 8 5 There is no specific test showing
when a substantial nexus exists, but it can hardly be said that a
business that has no sales associates in the state, has no offices in
the state, conducts no business on property in the state, and does
not intentionally advertise in the state could have a substantial
nexus with the state. The only connection is that a customer hap-
pened to have the product shipped to the state. There is really no
slighter presence, other than a customer simply viewing the website
using a computer within the state.
The cost of complying with potentially fifty different state tax
codes would be highly burdensome to companies. Technology has
evolved to make it easier for companies to handle compliance with
181. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249 (1992);
see also Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 552 (1977).
182. Pamela Swidler, The Beginning of the End to a Tax-Free Internet: Developing an E-
Commerce Clause, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 541, 578 (2006).
183. Id. at 571.
184. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14, at 481.
185. Nat'l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556.
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state taxes.186 Data analytics is a huge part of the business world
today, and it is benefitting many companies because companies can
track countless trends, potentially including where customers are
likely to order from and send products.187 There is no way, however,
for a company to be able to predict with certainty which state's busi-
ness privilege taxes they would have to pay because states have
varying definitions of what certain products are and if and how they
are taxed.188 It goes against any conception of fairness that the
business should share in the miniscule burden on a state where
they simply ship goods.
That is not to say that if the company is making a substantial
profit from the state's consumer base, it should not be deemed to
have a substantial nexus and bear a tax burden to those customers;
however, the burden should be proportional. In Wayfair, respond-
ents argued during oral argument that the average Internet sale is
$84, and at 200 transactions that only equals out to less than
$17,000 not the $100,000 threshold South Dakota imposed.189 Their
point is that the requirements are highly inconsistent.190 Further,
South Dakota's economy is vastly different than that of a state like
California or New York. 191 Two hundred transactions in either of
those states equating to $17,000 of gross income is not fairly com-
parable to their economies. States will likely be able to impose tax
regimes that take advantage of Internet sellers and will burden
burgeoning business by increasing compliance costs. Those regimes
will likely widely vary, and will not provide consistent support pro-
portionate to the use of the state market.
State business privilege taxes do not impose any greater cost on
Internet-based companies than they do on local companies; how-
ever, they are still discriminatory because they tax the privilege of
186. See, e.g., QUICKBOOKS, https://quickbooks.intuit.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2018);
TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
187. Data Analytics, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/d/data-analytics.asp.
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080
(2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 2446095.
189. Id. at 55.
190. See id.
191. See Gross Domestic Product by State, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS,
https://apps.bea. gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step= #reqid= 70&step= 10&isuri= &




000,53000,54000,55000,56000&7036=- 1&7001 =5200& 7002 =5&7090 70&70007=2017&
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doing interstate business. Online companies are selling to custom-
ers just as companies located within the state's borders are. The
conglomeration of these taxes could be financially detrimental to a
business, especially when that business may not be sophisticated
enough to track the amount sold or shipped to each state; such as a
seller on Etsy. Swidler claims that the physical presence require-
ment has the effect of burdening local retailers that operate physi-
cal stores in multiple states.192 Her argument is that these local
retailers must keep track of all the state taxes imposed on them,
but because the online retailers do not qualify for taxation, they do
not bear the cost of compliance.193 The Court has already stated the
Commerce Clause was not meant "to relieve those engaged in inter-
state commerce from their just share of state tax burden even
though it increases the cost of doing the business."194 Its not that
Internet companies should be exempt from paying taxes, but that
they should not pay taxes in states that they have a miniscule con-
nection with.
Additionally, the Court has held that a tax on the privilege of do-
ing interstate business is discriminatory.195 The business con-
ducted by Internet-based retailers is inherently interstate business.
They are not conducting business in any state specifically, but in
the virtual realm of the Internet. Further, to the extent that e-com-
merce could be considered a local activity, the activity is so inherent
to interstate commerce that it should be afforded the protection of
the Commerce Clause. Memphis Natural Gas Co. held that activi-
ties protected by the United States and not the state itself were con-
sidered beyond the boundaries of the state.196 Mail services are one
of the services protected by the United States government and not
state governments.
197
Lastly, privilege taxes on Internet-based companies are not fairly
related to the protections provided by the state. These companies
use almost no protection or services provided by the state. They are
not even driving on the roads of the states; the mail trucks are.
"[T]he measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent
of the contact, since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer
in the State that may properly be made to bear a 'just share of state
192. Swidler, supra note 182, at 569-70.
193. Id.
194. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (quoting W. Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
195. See Memphis Nat. Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96 (1948).
196. Id. at 95.
197. See generally 39 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
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tax burden."'198 The taxes imposed in these cases are not a "just
share" of the state tax burden because the minimal extent of the
companies' contacts with the state impose, at best, a miniscule bur-
den on those states.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ESTABLISHING A MAXIMUM
THRESHOLD FOR NEXUS AND CLARIFYING THE MANY DIFFERENCES
AMONG STATE DEFINITIONS FOR INTERNET-BASED COMPANIES IS
MUCH NEEDED, AND IT IS A BETTER WAY TO SUBJECT THESE
COMPANIES TO TAXATION WHILE NOT UNDULY BURDENING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The dormant Commerce Clause only applies to those activities on
which Congress has not spoken, but Congress has the power to es-
tablish guidelines for imposing gross-receipts taxes on Internet-
based companies.199 If Congress were to pass legislation on the
privilege tax issue, then the analysis would fall squarely within the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.20 0 Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress can regulate channels of interstate commerce, in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities substantially
affecting interstate commerce.20 1 The Internet is an instrumental-
ity used in interstate commerce, and could even be considered a
channel. Congress would be well within its power to establish
guidelines for Internet business privilege taxes, and such legisla-
tion would alleviate the difficulties that arise from state business
privilege taxes on Internet-based companies.
In fact, Congress has demonstrated such power in the past re-
garding net income taxes with the enactment of Public Law 86-272:
Congress passed Public Law 86-272 in 1959 to protect out-of-
state corporations from state income taxes when the corpora-
tion's only in-state activity was salespeople soliciting sales
from customers in the state. Nexus for net income tax purposes
is not established merely because sales of tangible personal
property are solicited within the states. The states are prohib-
ited under Public Law 86-272 (P.L. 86-272) from imposing a net
198. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (quoting W. Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
199. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence [sic] and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
201. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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income tax on an out-of-state entity if the entity's only connec-
tion with the state is the solicitation of orders for tangible per-
sonal property, if those orders are accepted and shipped or de-
livered from outside the state.
20 2
Not only does P.L. 86-272 demonstrate Congress's ability to im-
pose guidelines and limits on a state's ability to tax out-of-state
sellers, it also demonstrates Congress's willingness to do so. P.L.
86-272 currently does not apply to gross-receipts taxes; however,
that does not mean that similar guidelines should not be imposed
for gross-receipts taxes.
As for the legal benefits, a federal law would clear up much of the
confusion surrounding this area of taxation. Internet sales place a
much larger burden at the federal level than they do at the state
level because most of the protections and services these e-commerce
retailers are using are federal, not state. It follows policy that the
tax should reimburse the cost of the burden on the federal govern-
ment. Further, a federal law would alleviate the need to place state
boundaries on the Internet. Finally, federal legislation would ad-
dress the complex issue of not only the definition of substantial
nexus, but also other definitions that are commonly different among
states, such as the definition of a service or the definition of a spe-
cific type of good (i.e. candy bar, clothing, etc.).
The federal legislation would also provide for a better framework
for Internet-based companies resulting in possible economic bene-
fits. First, better compliance leads to higher investment in govern-
ment programs, which is the purpose of taxation, and may lead to
company investment in the marketplace.20 3 "Good compliance out-
comes begin with good legislation.'" 20 4 The federal guidelines would
likely be complied with more than differing individual state taxes,
and, therefore, would result in less court costs to resolve disputes.
One federal law is much more easily complied with than fifty differ-
ent state laws. When the law is ambiguous, it allows taxpayers to
act in unintended ways, creating disputes over interpretation.
20 5
Therefore, where there is good, clear legislation, there is less en-
forcement and litigation costs. Where enforcement and litigation
202. AICPA State Tax Nexus Guide, AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCT. 2 (2014),
https://www.vataxus.com/pdf/AICPA.pdf.
203. FORUM ON TAX ADMINISTRATION COMPLIANCE SUB GROUP, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT: MANAGING
AND IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 70 (Oct. 2004), https://www.oecd.org/tax/administra-
tion/33818656.pdf.




costs are diminished, the government can spend more money fund-
ing government programs.
Second, when the law is clear, companies can more easily comply
with it,206 thereby reducing their compliance costs and investing
back into their companies and the economy. Compliance costs are
those costs that an individual incurs above the actual cost of the
tax, and can include accounting costs and other indirect costs.
20 7
"Psychological" costs, like stress of compliance on the workforce, can
also be a factor.208 A federal tax would provide a much clearer re-
quirement than multiple state laws. The direct compliance costs
would be reduced because there would be less interpretation of mul-
tiple laws, and a better interpretation of one law. Companies would
have more money to reinvest either into their products and people,
or into the economy at large. The indirect costs, such as psycholog-
ical costs, would be reduced because compliance is less complex, al-
lowing the companies' workforces to focus more on things such as
new developments and business expansion. Better compliance
means that expected revenues can be met and these Internet-based
companies would be better able to foresee their annual taxation ob-
ligations. The money saved in compliance could be reinvested,
providing more growth opportunity for a better e-commerce market,
and potentially investment in the state.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the current Complete Auto framework, state business priv-
ilege taxes on Internet companies whose only contacts with the
state are the shipment of products to customers are an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. Congress should enact leg-
islation that provides guidelines for state Internet business privi-
lege taxes that would both clarify the legal landscape and provide
economic benefits from greater compliance and reinvestment. The
advancing technological society we live in today provides its own
difficulties when interpreting the law, especially the dormant Com-
merce Clause. When the dormant Commerce Clause was first es-
tablished, the Internet and the potential to do business without
ever being present in the state was likely an inconceivable idea.
While case law has tried to keep up with the changing e-commerce
environment, it has not made the murky issue any clearer. This
area of the law is likely not going to remain stagnant, but, instead,
206. Id.
207. Id. at 37.
208. Id.
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new technological advances will create more confusion. If no action
is taken by Congress, the burden on interstate commerce will only
get worse.
